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As the sole unelected branch of the federal government, the role of the Supreme Court continues to be 
scrutinized and debated by politicians nationwide. In addressing the function of the court, Alexander 
Hamilton wrote: "It is far more rational to suppose, that the courts were designed to be an intermediate 
body between the people and the legislature, in order, among other things, to keep the latter within the 
limits assigned to their authority. The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the 
courts."[1] The political authority and solidarity of the court was first truly tested by the issue of slavery. 
In 1857, a case resonating from the Louisiana Court of Appeals prompted Chief Justice Roger Taney to 
attempt to unilaterally resolve the issue of slavery with the use of unprecedented judicial power. The 
Chief Justice's effort to resolve the slavery issue instead transformed the "peculiar institution" of the 
South into "a federal institution, the common patrimony and shame of all the states."[2] Taney's 
extension of judicial influence not only reflected his personal political inclination towards unilateral 
action, but also increased sectional animosity throughout the nation. Due to Taney's majority opinion in 
Scott v. Sandford, past negotiations about slavery were nullified and war became the only viable option 
for restoring the Union. 
The Development of the Court, the Rise of Roger Taney, and Expanding Bitterness 
In order to accurately comprehend the ramifications of Taney's majority opinion in Dred Scott, it is 
imperative to understand the court prior to 1857. In Federalist 78 (1788), Alexander Hamilton referred to 
the court as "the least dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution; because it will be least in a 
capacity to annoy or injure them."[3] The Constitution produced by the 1787 Philadelphia convention 
was particularly vague in addressing the power of the court. As a result of this imprecise authority, the 
court was not categorized as a desirable occupation for public servants. For example, after being 
appointed as the first Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, John Jay promptly resigned to pursue the 
governorship of New York. According to judicial historian Henry J. Abraham, "Jay's view of the young 
Supreme Court was an inauspicious body, characterized by little work, dissatisfied personnel, and a lack of 
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popular esteem and understanding."[4] Additionally, politicians were dissuaded by associate justices' 
obligation to "ride circuit," or travel hundreds of miles to preside over certain appellate courts. The 
prestige and prominent legal authority that marks the contemporary court was not established until 1801, 
with John Adams' appointment of John Marshall to the position of Chief Justice. 
Within two years of being appointed, Marshall revolutionized the third branch of government by 
substantially augmenting its power in the American political system. In Marbury v. Madison (1803), 
Marshall used the court's interpretative authority to strike down an act of Congress as unconstitutional. 
With his majority opinion in Marbury, Marshall transformed the court into an institution of oversight, and 
subsequently afforded the court the power of judicial review. Marshall contested in his opinion that "all 
laws which are repugnant to the constitution are null and void,"[5] and thus granted the power to the 
judiciary to interpret and eradicate acts of Congress. Marshall utilized judicial review to apply his radically 
federalist agenda by extending the court's jurisdiction over states,[6] recognizing the constitutionality of 
the National Bank,[7] and by limiting President Jackson's influence on American-Indian removal.[8] 
Marshall's death in 1835 concluded his historic 34-year tenure, and moreover gave the Jackson 
administration the opportunity to appoint a new Chief Justice. In regards to Jackson's criteria for 
appointing Marshall's replacement, historian Henry Abraham wrote, "He was determined to reward the 
party faithful; if that meant extending his much-vaunted spoils system to include nominees to the highest 
judicial body in the land, so be it."[9] Jackson's appointment of Roger Taney as Chief Justice engendered 
the political cronyism that defined his patent "spoils system." Taney's willingness to rely on unilateral 
decision-making coupled with his general disregard of historical political precedent persuaded Jackson to 
appoint his longtime collaborator and ally to the bench. 
During the Jackson administration, and prior to his Supreme Court appointment, Taney had fashioned 
himself a renowned political reputation as a devoted Jacksonian Democrat and advocate of the president. 
In repayment for his abiding commitment to the President, Jackson appointed Taney to a number of 
positions including Chairman of the Central Committee of Maryland and Attorney General of the United 
States.[10] His most contentious nomination came in 1832, when Jackson selected Taney to become the 
Secretary of the Treasury, on a recess appointment. The cabinet vacancy was caused by Jackson's 
continued debate with Congress over the Second National Bank. Jackson argued that executive power 
permitted him to unilaterally close the National Bank. The three previous Treasury Secretaries rejected 
Jackson's demands to transfer government funds to privatized institutions, a move that would have 
certainly sabotaged the National Bank. President Jackson depicted his Secretaries as insubordinate, and 
fired them upon their refusal to act. Jackson appointed Taney during a congressional recess because of his 
pledge to resolve the banking crisis by complying with Jackson's agenda. Taney's management of the 
Second National Bank verified his willingness to expand the court's constitutional authority in order to 
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solve national controversy. Taney's inclination to rely on his personal judgment persuaded him to attempt 
to solve the slavery crisis in Dred Scott.  
Due to Taney's radical extension of executive power, the Senate rejected his confirmation as Treasury 
Secretary when they reconvened in 1834. Jackson, angered by the Senate's action, wrote to Taney, "For 
the prompt and disinterested aid thus afforded me, at the risk of personal sacrifice which were then 
probable and which has now been realized, I feel that I owe you a debt of gratitude and regard which I 
have not the power to discharge." [11] Jackson got his chance to repay his debt in 1835, when Chief 
Justice Marshal died. Jackson submitted the loyal Taney as his nomination to be the highest jurist in the 
nation. The Senate demonstrated minor resistance to Taney's confirmation and he was accepted with a 
29 to 15 vote, but was opposed by Henry Clay, Daniel Webster, and John C. Calhoun.[12] Upon becoming 
the fifth Chief Justice of the United States, Taney's views on slavery were uncertain. Taney was an 
adamant advocate of state's rights and argued that the federal government had no jurisdiction in 
regulating slavery. However, he morally disagreed with slavery, and liberated his personal slaves 30 years 
before being confirmed to the court.[13] Taney even signed the majority opinion that afforded habeas 
corpus to the crew of the Amistad. Chief Justice Taney's moderate moral position on slavery confirmed 
that his majority in Dred Scott was not blatant social racism, but was an effort to resolve an issue that very 
literally divided America. Upon granting a writ of certiorari to Scott v. Sandford, Taney decided to become 
the mediator of an issue that redefined the national identity. 
When the court granted the writ of certiorari to Dred Scott's petition, the nation was already on the 
threshold of division. The issue of slavery highlighted the polarization of geographic regions that had been 
in existence since the inception of western civilization on the North America continent. In a letter to his 
friend John Holmes, Thomas Jefferson portrayed the issue of slavery as, "a firebell in the night [that] 
awakened and filled me with terror."[14] This exceptionally divisive issue not only plagued politics and 
created divisions, but also transcended to the economy and society. While the Northern economy 
developed a productive infrastructure and manufacturing system, the Southern economy still depended 
exclusively on slave labor. Uncle Tom's Cabin, and William Lloyd Garrison's The Liberator, additionally 
propelled the slave debate into mainstream popular culture. Northern politicians became disillusioned 
with Congressional and Presidential action. Countless Americans felt that the federal government was not 
representing the will of the people, but the interests of a "slave power." Congressional support for the 
Mexican-American War (1846), The Gadsden Purchase (1854), and the Kansas-Nebraska Act (1854) 
further enraged Northern politicians. In debate over the Gadsden Purchase, one Ohio Congressman 
summarized Northern rhetoric when he claimed, "It is inconsistent with the genius of our institutions, and 
injurious to the character of the United States, to extend slavery."[15] The South on the other hand, felt 
that the North was attempting to corrupt an institution, which was engrained in their economic and social 
history. The Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 exemplified Southern efforts to permanently institute slavery 
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protections in federal statutory law. The deadlock over slavery that beleaguered Congress throughout the 
1850s persuaded numerous politicians to encourage the Supreme Court to consider the slavery issue. 
Countless members of Congress felt that representative democracy had failed when confronted with the 
slavery debate, and many had assurance that the Supreme Court could finally bring closure to this 
troublesome issue. Ironically, political confidence in the court diminished after the Scott decision 
amplified hostility against slavery throughout the North.  
Taney's Detrimental Majority 
After he won a decisive victory in the election of 1856, the "doughface" President James Buchanan was 
challenged by the slavery issue two days into his presidency. On March 6th, 1857 the court announced its 
opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Taney attempted to decisively 
conclude the slavery debate in America. In the first portion of his ruling, Taney determined that slaves 
were not citizens of the United States, but were merely property. Taney concluded that since slaves were 
equivalent to property, they had no right to petition any court in the United States, and specifically the 
Supreme Court had no jurisdiction to liberate Scott. The opinion stated: "The court should be of opinion 
that the facts stated in it disqualify the plaintiff from becoming a citizen, in the sense in which that words 
is used in the Constitution of the United States, then the judgment of the Circuit Court is erroneous, and 
must be reversed."[16] Although many legal historians argue that the court had no standing to make a 
ruling after invalidating the jurisdiction of Scott's claim, Taney asserted that since slaves were property, 
they were warranted no constitutional protection.[17] Taney justified his position by arguing that at the 
time of the drafting of the Declaration and ratification of the Constitution, slaves were not recognized as 
equal persons. The Chief Justice pointed to Article I, Section II, Clause III which stated, "Representatives 
and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, 
according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free 
Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three 
fifths of all other Persons."[18] The court's recognition of slaves as property not only ceased all gains 
made towards emancipation, but also guaranteed whites a right to own slaves as protected by the Fifth 
Amendments due process clause.  
After denying Scott's claim, Taney struck a fatal blow to slave concessions that ultimately complicated 
negotiations between the North and South. Taney asserted that slaves' standing as legal property made it 
unconstitutional for Congress to regulate the institution in the territories. Since the Missouri Compromise 
clearly prohibited involuntary servitude in certain geographic regions, it was subsequently deemed 
unconstitutional. While Article IV, Section III gave Congress the authority to "dispose of and make all 
needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United 
States,"[19] Taney felt that property regulation exceeded the authority of the legislature. He wrote, "The 
words rules and regulations are usually employed in the Constitution in speaking of some particular 
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specified power which it means to confer on the Government, and not, as we have seen, when granting 
general powers of legislation."[20] Although Taney cited no court precedent or rhetoric of the founders 
at this portion of the opinion, this verdict proved to be the most devastating to the stability of the 
Union.[21] The Missouri Compromise, and subsequent minor conciliations, had held the Union together 
for multiple decades. The Dred Scott opinion additionally exempted all future territories from 
Congressional regulation over slavery. This palpably threatened the legislative equilibrium between slave 
and free states. With one decision, the Supreme Court invalidated all of the negotiations of the past 37 
years, which permitted the United States to at least appear to be a cohesive nation.  
Taney's majority opinion embodied the unilateralist fortitude that persuaded President Jackson to appoint 
him in the first place. Chief Justice Taney had previously indicated his willingness to use unilateral 
authority during the controversy over the Second Bank of the United States. The majority opinion clearly 
verified Taney's resolution to decisively bring closure to the slavery debate. According to Civil War scholar 
Don Farenbacher, "He [Taney] was, in fact, determined to rule on the constitutionality of the Missouri 
Compromise restriction, and his strategy clearly reflected that determination."[22] The longing of the 
Chief Justice to have the court act as the final arbiter over the divisive issue of slavery, even created 
extensive tension between Taney and certain Associate Justices. While Taney exceeded the compulsory 
five-vote majority, the dissenting justices felt that the court had sidestepped democracy in an attempt to 
solve the slave crisis. The tension in the Supreme Court chambers became so passionate, that Chief 
Justice Taney prohibited his clerk from delivering dissenting Justice Benjamin Curtis a copy of the majority 
opinion.[23] Even though Chief Taney's considerable expansion of judicial authority shocked the 
Northern population, it is particularly illustrative of Taney's personal political ideology.  
Scott as a Catalyst for Secession & War 
The judgment in Scott v. Sandford generated immense pandemonium in the North, and received ample 
praise throughout slave states. Taney attempted to ultimately conclude the slave controversy in the 
United States, and would end up augmenting sectional tensions. The New York Herald wrote, "Dred Scott 
and the decision which bears his name will be familiar words in the mouth of the ranting demagogue in 
rostrum and pulpit, and of the student of political history."[24] The decision augmented the Northern 
paranoia of a government controlled by a "slave power." The opinion provided a rallying point for 
energetic abolitionists against the "slavocracy" who they felt dominated the politics of the nation. The 
New York Times referred to Dred Scott personally as, "His name will live when those of CLAY, and 
CALHOUN, and BENTON will be feebly remembered or wholly forgotten."[25] The Scott decision 
reenergized the abhorrence for slavery and encouraged abolitionists to intensify their rhetoric. The 
escalation of national hostility expanded sectional animosity so extensively that the South deemed 
differences between themselves and the North irreconcilable, and subsequently abandoned the Union. 
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Taney's opinion invigorated Northern suspicions, but it made the issue of slavery irreconcilable. In order 
to permanently reverse the Scott decision, the legislature would have to pass a Constitutional amendment 
recognizing African-Americans as citizens, which they would only do after the carnage of the Civil War 
(Fourteenth Amendment, 1868). Since only the southern states in the Union favored slavery expansion, 
neither of these proposed amendments would have earned the votes necessary for passage before the 
Civil War. The republican government mixed in a deadlock over slavery, looked to the court as the final 
magistrate in the growing sectional crisis, but received instead an opinion that increased hostility. Taney's 
opinion was an unmistakable attempt to resolve a crisis that had confronted the nation since the 
Philadelphia Convention in 1787. Taney biographer, Charles Smith, explained Taney's intension, "to save 
the Union by protecting property rights guaranteed in the Constitution."[26] Ironically, the Taney opinion 
helped push the divided nation on a path for war. Besides eternally engraining discrimination in 
Constitutional precedent, the Scott decision destroyed the compromises that had held the nation 
together for more than a generation. The termination of all previous conciliations on slavery destroyed 
the only safeguard that had managed to keep a polarized nation united.  
From Unilateralism to War 
As the ineffective Buchanan administration came to a conclusion in 1861, the United States was literally 
divided. During his renowned debates with Senator Stephan A. Douglas, Buchanan's successor Abraham 
Lincoln asserted the following about Dred Scott: "I agree with Judge Douglas (dissenting justice) he is not 
my equal in many respects-certainly not in color, perhaps not in moral or intellectual endowment. But in 
the right to eat the bread, without the leave of anybody else, which his own hand earns, he is my equal 
and the equal of Judge Douglas, and the equal of every living man."[27] Although Lincoln was not a 
rampant abolitionist, his moderate apprehension towards the Dred Scott decision encouraged numerous 
Southerners to believe that his presidency brought radical Northern politics to the White House. Lincoln's 
interpretation of Constitutional law caused him to have a different interpretation of Scott's legal claims 
than Chief Justice Taney. Taney's attempt to protect the Union with his "final judgment" on slavery 
provoked the animosity that Lincoln would employ on his rise to the Presidency. The Dred Scott opinion 
not only significantly expanded the authority and influence of the Supreme Court, but it demonstrated 
the determination of Taney to unilaterally solve the slavery debate. Almost a century later, the same 
public complaint of judicial activism that marked Taney's tenure, was applied to Chief Justice Warren 
desegregation of America's school. While Taney's utilization of judicial review engrained American law 
with racism, Warren's decision enabled millions of African-Americans to build an educational base to 
overthrow the shackles of tyranny, which plagued this minority population for centuries.  
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